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“Drive-by” Jurisdiction: Congressional 





On July 9, 2020, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and Trump v. Deutsche 
Bank AG, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not adequately 
consider the separation of powers concerns attendant to congressional 
subpoenas for presidential information.  Given that the question presented 
in Mazars concerned whether Congress had a legitimate legislative purpose 
in subpoenaing the President’s personal records, the Supreme Court’s 
decision is anything but a model of clarity.  The Court simultaneously 
opined that disputes “involving nonprivileged, private information” “do[ ] 
not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations” while claiming 
“congressional subpoenas for the President’s information unavoidably pit 
the political branches against one another.”  This essay presents a more 
precise framework for adjudicating interbranch disputes.  By understanding 
Congress as it understands itself, this article draws a legal distinction 
between congressional investigations of the private sphere versus oversight 
of the Executive Branch.  It analogizes Congress’s regulatory investigations 
to the sorts of quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative regulatory inquiries 
commonplace among federal agencies.  Like regulatory inquiries by federal 
agencies, subpoenas for testimony and documents are enforceable against 
the private sphere.  Oversight subpoenas, it is argued, are not enforceable 
precisely because oversight involves political questions inappropriate for 
judicial resolution.  Just like in the administrative context, where regulatory 
 
 * Vice President for Legal and Policy, Trust Ventures, a venture capital firm investing in 
highly regulated industries.  From 2017 to 2020, Epstein was a Special Assistant and Senior 
Associate Counsel to the President.  From 2009 to 2011, Epstein served as a counsel for oversight 
and investigations on the Committee on Oversight and Reform in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
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inquiries must be purged of evidence of political taint, any regulatory 
inquiry from Congress must be likewise detached from its more politicized 
counterpart in the name of oversight.  In this sense, the accommodation 
hinted in Chief Justice Roberts’ Mazars opinion can be properly understood 
as a requirement that Congress exhaust its political remedies before seeking 
private ones.  As such, the analytic framework presented here makes the 
otherwise hard case of Mazars an easy case of identifying an improper 
attempt to conduct oversight in the facade of a regulatory inquiry, one 
tainted by prior political efforts and a prematurely clotured political 
process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 27, 2020, in the companion cases of Trump v. Mazars USA, 
LLP and Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, the Supreme Court requested the 
Office of Solicitor General and the parties brief “whether the political 
question doctrine or related justiciability principles bear on the Court’s 
adjudication of these cases.”1  This essay seeks to answer that question in the 
affirmative and develops a framework for evaluating interbranch 
information disputes concealed within congressional investigations of 
businesses and individuals.2  Both Mazars3 and Deutsche Bank4 are similar 
cases (hereinafter combined as “Mazars”)5: congressional committees 
seeking from private companies (here, information about President Donald 
Trump) what they could not obtain directly from the Executive Branch.6  
The framework to be defended, however, relies on a set of assumptions that 
will be implicitly defended through exposition of the argument below.  
Those assumptions are as follows: 
1) When a congressional committee makes the decision to conduct 
an investigation of the Executive Branch (“congressional 
oversight”), that choice commits Congress to obtaining a 
political, not legal, remedy for noncompliance.7  The D.C. 
Circuit’s accommodation doctrine is unsound because it 
presumes interbranch information disputes are justiciable.8 
 
 1. United States Supreme Court, Order List: 590 U.S. (Apr. 27, 2020), available at 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/042720zor_6k47.pdf. 
 2. A version of this essay can be found on the Yale Journal on Regulation blog.  See Daniel 
Epstein, Congressional Oversight Disputes as Political Questions, Part I: The Decline of the 
Interbranch Accommodation, YALE J. ON REG. (June 8, 2020), 
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/congressional-oversight-disputes-as-political-questions-part-i-the-
decline-of-the-interbranch-accommodation-doctrine-by-daniel-epstein/; Daniel Epstein, 
Congressional Oversight Disputes as Political Questions, Part II: Accommodation as an 
Intrabranch Doctrine Governing Committee Investigations, YALE J. ON REG. (June 15, 2020), 
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/congressional-oversight-disputes-as-political-questions-part-ii-
accommodation-as-an-intrabranch-doctrine-governing-committee-investigations-by-daniel-epstein/. 
 3. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 4. Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 5. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 660 (2019). 
 6. Compare Mazars, 940 F.3d at 710, with Deutsche Bank, 943 F.3d at 627. 
 7. H.R. Rep. No. 105-830, at 137 (1998) ("The Constitution contains a single procedure for 
Congress to address the fitness for office of the President of the United States—impeachment by the 
House, and subsequent trial by the Senate.") (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3). 
 8. See Mazars, 940 F.3d at 748 (holding that a subpoena issued by Congress to Mazars was 
valid and enforceable).  But see id. at 784 (Rao, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution and our historical 
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2) When a congressional committee makes the decision to conduct 
an investigation of a non-governmental entity, that choice 
permits Congress to obtain a legal remedy for noncompliance, 
but only if its investigation is cabined by a legitimate legislative 
(regulatory) purpose9—much in the same way that agency 
investigations, as distinct from law enforcement, are cabined by 
a rulemaking purpose under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.10 
3) Legal doctrines that apply legislative purpose requirements to 
congressional oversight or deem regulatory investigations as 
non-justiciable fail to properly distinguish between 
“congressional oversight of administration” and “regulatory 
investigations by Congress.”  Both congressional oversight11 
and regulatory investigations by Congress12 are creatures of 
law. 
Even assuming the validity of the assumptions outlined, above, 
Congress would contend that the congressional suit to compel Mazars’s 
compliance with its subpoena is justiciable under the “regulatory 
investigation” framework because the dispute is not between the Executive 
and Legislative Branches.13 
This essay seeks to defend the argument that Mazars was an interbranch 
 
practice draw a consistent line between the legislative and judicial powers of Congress.  The 
majority crosses this boundary for the first time by upholding this subpoena investigating the illegal 
conduct of the President under the legislative power.”). 
 9. See id. at 783 (Rao, J. dissenting) (“While congressional oversight investigations may probe 
a wide range of matters . . . such investigations may proceed ancillary to the legislative power.”). 
 10. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S § 551 (2020); accord. Exec. Order No. 13892, 
84 Fed. Reg. 55239 & Exec. Order No. 13924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31353 (stating that when investigations 
proceed via jurisdictional statements that function as “legal standards,” those jurisdictional 
statements are “rules” not “adjudications” under the under the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.  Congressional oversight derives its authority from the “Rules of 
Proceedings” clause, id., which is referenced as the basis for section 136 of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act.  2 U.S.C. 190d (1970). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Congressional investigations of non-government persons under 
Congress’s authority to regulate intelligibly are pursuant to the “Necessary and Proper” clause, id., 
which first found statutory articulation in 1857 as an act entitled  “An Act More Effectually to 
Enforce the Attendance of Witnesses on the Summons of Either House of Congress, and to Compel 
Them to Discover Testimony,”  11 Stat. 155, ch. 19 (1857). 
 13. Mazars, 940 F.3d at 725 (stating that the court “must determine whether Congress’s 
‘legislative purpose is being served’ without taking into account either whether the investigation will 
reveal, or whether the investigators are motivated to reveal, criminal conduct”). 
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information dispute in the sheep’s clothing of a subpoena enforcement suit.  
The argument proceeds in two steps.  First, it seeks to establish clarity for 
the legal framework governing congressional inquiries by showing that the 
accommodation doctrine, an exhaustion and ripeness doctrine of the D.C. 
Circuit, has been largely repudiated by the federal courts as an appropriate 
legal doctrine for evaluating interbranch information disputes.  But second, 
it resurrects the accommodation doctrine as a valid doctrine for assessing 
regulatory disputes between Congress and a non-governmental party when 
the regulatory inquiry originated as an oversight matter, as in Mazars.  This 
second argument simply rearticulates what accommodation actually is: 
exhaustion of the political process.  This political exhaustion doctrine, 
however, requires the branches to use effective government relations to 
resolve disputes not as a means of ripening congressional suits against the 
Executive Branch but to ensure regulatory investigations are not a backdoor 
means for political oversight.  In other words, the test for whether a 
congressional investigation constitutes political oversight is whether political 
remedies of appropriations, impeachment and removal, or elections 
effectively moot the supposed harm to Congress. 
II. RECENT JURISPRUDENTIAL INDICATIONS OF THE DECLINING 
TENABILITY OF THE ACCOMMODATION DOCTRINE 
The D.C. Circuit’s accommodation doctrine states that a duly authorized 
congressional information request to the Executive Branch (“oversight”) 
initiates the “implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation 
. . . of the needs of the conflicting branches.”14  This back and forth between 
the branches has been described by the D.C. Circuit as a constitutionally-
mandated process of accommodation by the parties of legislative need and 
Executive Branch confidentiality interests.15  Accommodation is “mandated” 
by the branches “on the expectation that where conflicts in scope of 
authority arose between the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic 
compromise would promote resolution of the dispute in the manner most 
likely to result in efficient and effective functioning of our governmental 
 
 14. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter 
“AT&T 2”].  
 15. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter 
“AT&T 1”].  As the AT&T 1 court explained, because the Justice Department sought an injunction 
against AT&T’s compliance with a House subpoena, the court permitted the House to intervene as 
“the real defendant in interest.”  Id.  
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The D.C. Circuit’s February 28, 2020, McGahn decision, authored by 
Judge Griffith, shreds the accommodation doctrine in a single stroke: “the 
entire analysis of the House’s standing to intervene in AT&T I consists of a 
single sentence, followed by no citations. ‘[D]rive-by jurisdictional rulings 
of this sort’ typically ‘have no precedential effect.’”17  Judge Griffith’s 
position is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Raines v. Byrd, a legislative 
standing case, definitively “compels the conclusion that we lack jurisdiction 
to consider lawsuits between the Legislative and Executive Branches.”18 
Even the McGahn district court, whose decision to enforce the subpoena 
for the testimony of the President’s counsel was reversed by the D.C. 
Circuit, skeptically received arguments about accommodation, finding, “the 
Court cannot accept DOJ’s present reliance on carefully curated rhetoric 
concerning historical accommodations practices”.19  And certainly, Judge 
Griffith, despite his deprecation of the accommodation doctrine as a tool 
justifying judicial review, noted its “use” in avoiding “premature[] 
involve[ment of] the courts”.20 
III. ACCOMMODATION AS A THRESHOLD FOR DEPOLITICIZING CONGRESS’S 
REGULATORY INVESTIGATIONS 
Given judicial skepticism toward relying on accommodation as a 
framework for evaluating interbranch information disputes, the federal 
courts have an opportunity to reevaluate these disputes by grounding them in 
constitutional and statutory text.  As noted above, Congress, in formalizing 
its committees, based their Executive Branch review authority as a function 
of congressional rules.  Only in the aftermath of the Nixon presidency was 
judicial review of congressional oversight even fathomable—as noted 
 
 16. AT&T 2, 567 F.2d at 127.  In AT&T 2, the D.C. Circuit held, “each branch should take 
cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic 
evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation.”  Id. 
 17. Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 
510, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) .  
 18. McGahn, 951 F.3d at 526;  accord. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997).  Raines found 
that “no suit [addressed by the D.C. Circuit] was brought on the basis of claimed injury to official 
authority or power.”  Id, at 826. 
 19. Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 173 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 20. McGahn, 951 F.3d at 537 (Henderson, J., concurring).. 
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below, the Supreme Court, in Marshall v. Gordon, while granting review of 
a dispute between a congressional committee and an Executive Branch 
official, determined that a congressional rule, as opposed to a law, cannot 
bind the Executive.21  A different history characterizes congressional 
investigations of non-government persons and the judicial review thereof.  
Congressional investigations aimed at the development of public-facing 
regulatory standards were the antecedent to the modern administrative state.  
Such inquiries, separate from congressional proceedings based in Article 
I,  § 5 (such as impeachment), are grounded in Article I, § 8’s “Necessary 
and Proper” clause and first found statutory articulation in “An Act More 
Effectually to Enforce the Attendance of Witnesses on the Summons of 
Either House of Congress, and to Compel Them to Discover Testimony.”22 
As presented before the D.C. Circuit in Mazars, the House Oversight 
Committee subpoena to Mazars cited, as its authority, House Rule X, which 
authorizes the Committee to “investigate ‘any matter at any time.’”23  
Standing committee jurisdictional rules trace back to the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946.24  This Act grounded congressional authority to 
“exercise continuous watchfulness” over the Executive Branch in the Rules 
of Proceedings Clause.25  Section 101 of the Legislative Reorganization Act 
states that “[t]he following sections of this title are enacted by the Congress: 
. . . As an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives.”26  Given this legal context, the Supreme Court has 
definitively opined that resolutions derived under the Rules of Proceedings 
Clause are not enforceable against the Executive Branch.27  On the two 
 
 21. 243 U.S. 521, 536 (1917) (noting that a congressional rule that binds the Executive Branch 
“would be absolutely destructive of the distinction between legislative, executive and judicial 
authority which is interwoven in the very fabric of the Constitution and would disregard express 
limitations therein . . . [and] there is no ground whatever for assuming that any implication as to such 
a power may be deduced from any grant of authority made to Congress by the Constitution”. 
 22. 11 Stat. 155, ch. 19 (1857). 
 23. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  
 24. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 31).  
 25. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 136 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 190d).  
 26. Id. at § 101.  
 27. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 536–37 (1917).  Albeit largely dismissed by post-
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) courts, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 182 
(1880), explicitly rejected the idea that Congress could judicially enforce its contempt power as a 
form of punishment against private parties; accord. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821) 
(recognizing Congress’s inherent contempt power against recalcitrant witnesses).  
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occasions prior to 1974 (when the Supreme Court decided Nixon28) where 
Congress held Executive Branch officials in contempt (George Seward in 
1869 and Snowden Marshall in 1916), both were grounded as necessary for 
the purposes of considering impeachment.29 
But if Congress as Executive Branch overseer versus Congress as 
regulator in need of information are distinguishable as a matter of 
constitutional and legal authority for purposes of judicial review, the 
accommodation doctrine would lack apparent utility.  The problem Mazars 
introduces is that Congress may strategically target an Executive Branch 
official through an otherwise garden variety regulatory investigation.  The 
same Oversight Committee that subpoenaed Mazars also filed suit against 
the General Services Administration for access to Trump Hotel documents,30 
and Oversight Committee members participated as plaintiffs in Blumenthal 
et al. v. Trump,31 both cases which, like Mazars, sought judicial sanction 
against the President for alleged constitutional violations.  The D.C. Circuit 
in Blumenthal and the D.C. district court in Cummings v. Murphy rejected 
the notion that the congressional plaintiffs had standing to sue.32 
The results of these cases, then, would make it difficult to argue that 
cases like Mazars, involving disputes between Congress and a company, 
raise the sorts of separation of powers concerns that would invoke a bar to 
standing under Raines v. Byrd.33  However, not all federal information 
disputes raising separation of powers questions involve a live conflict 
between Congress and the Executive Branch.  Questions about the scope of 
presidential communications privilege or the Office of the President’s 
immunity from civil discovery34 have been resolved in the context of citizen 
 
 28. United State v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (holding if “the legitimate needs of the 
judicial process . . . outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing 
interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch”). 
 29. Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1135–39 
(2009) (discussing the congressional history of finding George Seward and Snowden Marshall in 
contempt of Congress).  
 30. See Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 31. See Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018) rev’d, 949 F.3d 14 (2020). 
 32. Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 117. 
 33. See Raines, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (holding members of Congress did not have 
standing to sue over loss of political power alleged from the Line Item Veto Act giving the President 
the power to strike items in a bill). 
 34. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004). 
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suits under information access statutes,35 as well as conflicts between 
presidentially-appointed investigators like Independent Counsels.36  In the 
context of congressional oversight hidden within a regulatory investigation, 
information law disputes between citizens with public rights against the 
government provide meaningful judicial standards for the significance and 
vitality of accommodation.  D.C. Circuit Judge Merrick Garland’s decision 
in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Secret Service “barred . . . end runs” 
to seek indirectly from the President information involving “separation-of-
powers concerns” when sought directly by Congress.37  As such, Congress 
should not be permitted to obtain a legal remedy by converting an oversight 
matter into a regulatory investigation when the evidence reflects a 
congressional failure to exhaust the political remedies available through the 
oversight process.  An oversight matter like Mazars could be resolved 
through either, or all of, restricting the President’s power legislatively 
(particularly through appropriations), impeaching and removing the 
President, removing the President through the electoral process, or utilizing 
public pressure to force the President to resign.  When Congress pursues 
oversight, then seeks to avoid a political remedy by substituting the 
government target for a non-governmental one, it has failed to effectively 
depoliticize its regulatory investigation.38  Politicized regulatory 
investigations constitute oversight which by definition is not required to 
have a legitimate rulemaking purpose.39 
The accommodation principle that requires exhaustion of political 
remedies prior to a legitimate regulatory investigation being ripe for judicial 
review invokes several federal administrative law doctrines.  First, it 
incorporates a requirement that Congress “exhaust” political remedies in 
making any initial choice to conduct congressional oversight before 
 
 35. See e.g. Buzzfeed, Inc. v. FBI, No. 18-cv-2567 (BAH), 2020 WL 2219246 (D.D.C. May 7, 
2020). 
 36. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 734, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting the “difficult business of 
delineating the scope and operation of the presidential communications privilege” by having to 
balance the interests of “the efficacy and quality of presidential decisionmaking” with “the dangers 
involved in cloaking governmental operations in secrecy”). 
 37. 726 F.3d 208, 225–226 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 38. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 748 (2019) (Rao, J. dissenting) (“[T]he subpoena 
targets the President and raises implications for the separation of powers that the majority cannot 
brush aside simply because the subpoena is addressed to the President's accountants, Mazars USA, 
LLP.”) 
 39. See Robert Longley, Congressional Oversight and the US Government, THOUGHTCO. 
(January 6, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/congressional-oversight-4177013. 
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Congress can meaningfully pursue the same subject matter through a 
regulatory investigation.40  Second, it applies the requirement that regulatory 
decision-making be free from political taint to Congress’s regulatory 
investigations.41 
In order for the argument to be valid, the law of administrative agencies 
must inform congressional investigations.  But this move is not a difficult 
one once we consider that any legislative power that can be validly 
delegated to the Executive Branch is judicially reviewable as ministerial as 
opposed to discretionary.  The Supreme Court has long sanctioned 
congressional delegation of its investigative authority to committees as 
legislative agencies.42  In 1838, the Supreme Court in Kendall v. United 
States crafted a distinction between congressional regulation of the 
ministerial responsibilities of Executive Branch officials and the political 
duties of such officials which would be immune from congressional 
inspection.43  The idea that Congress can assign ministerial duties to 
Executive officers and monitor their compliance with such duties is a central 
ideology held by congressional oversight principals and good government 
advocates.44 
 
 40. See Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 
749, 765 (1975) (“Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference 
with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an 
opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience 
and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.”); Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics v. Am, Action Network, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2019) 
(“Administrative exhaustion requirements ensure that an agency is able to take a first pass at the 
facts alleged and to make determinations using its relative expertise. Exhaustion also promotes 
conciliatory efforts.”). 
 41. See Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar, 642 F.3d 212, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[A]n agency must 
determine, and give effect to, the decision that would have been made had politics not intruded.”).  
 42. For instance, legislation passed in 1879 permitted Congress to delegate its adjudication of 
private claims against the United States (traditionally handled by the Committee on Claims) to a 
federal trial judge.  20 Stat. 278.  
 43. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 610 (1838) (“There are certain political duties 
imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the dischcarge of which is under the 
direction of the President.  But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon 
any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured 
and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are 
subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President.  And this is emphatically 
the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial character.”).  
 44. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 264–274 (1926) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); see also 
Daniel Epstein, Kendall v. United States and the Inspector General Dilemma, UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 
ONLINE (June 22, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/06/22/ig-dilemma-epstein/. 
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The Supreme Court, the same year that both the Legislative 
Reorganization Act and the Administrative Procedure Act became law, held 
that agency exercises of the “subpoena power for securing evidence” with 
“the aid of the district court in enforcing it” is an “authority . . . clearly to be 
comprehended in the ‘necessary and proper’ clause, as incidental to both its 
general legislative and its investigative powers.”45  Thus, in no uncertain 
terms, Congress’s power to conduct regulatory investigations can be 
delegated to quasi-legislative agencies.  The theory of accommodation 
presented here, then, involves the application of administrative law 
principles to regulatory investigations by Congress to ensure they are not 
backdoor means of political oversight.  Political exhaustion ensures that 
Congress’s regulatory investigation is for a legitimate rulemaking 
(legislative) purpose. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The D.C. Circuit’s October 11, 2019 opinion in Trump v. Mazars stated, 
“[t]he lesson of McGrain is that an investigation may properly focus on one 
individual if that individual’s conduct offers a valid point of departure for 
remedial legislation.  Again, such is the case here.”46  The framework 
presented here permits the distinction of Mazars from McGrain by 
reintroducing “accommodation” as a test for evaluating the legitimacy of 
regulatory investigations.  In McGrain, the investigative target was the 
brother of the former Attorney General and the political remedy—removal 
of an Attorney General alleged to have engaged in wrongdoing—had 
already occurred before the case reached any court.47  None of these 
circumstances are present in the Mazars case.  A political exhaustion 
requirement for regulatory investigations by Congress ensures clarification 
of justiciable conflicts between Congress and individual witnesses while 
averting the need for federal courts to craft political remedies in legal terms.  
Raines v. Byrd sought to prevent the judicial superintendence of the 
Legislative Branch’s own power by placing courts in the position of 
determining what constitutes an intrabranch informational injury.48 
 
 45. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946). 
 46. 940 F.3d 710, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  
 47. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 150–52 (1927). 
 48. 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (“Although the contest here is not formally between the political 
branches . . . it is in substance an interbranch controversy about calibrating the legislative and 
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Congress has a near limitless amount of institutional remedies for 
Executive Branch noncompliance in the form of inherent contempt, 
impeachment, removal, appropriations, or competitive electioneering.  But 
Congress’s decision to not engage in political remedies in favor of using its 
investigative power should not be an opportunity for judicial paternalism as 
a substitute for effective politics.  Requiring Congress’s regulatory inquiries 
to be free of any nexus to congressional oversight of administration and to 
be untainted by the inherently political nature of oversight is not simply a 
means for protecting a fair process—it prevents Congress from abdicating its 

























executive powers, as well as an intrabranch dispute between segments of Congress itself. 
Intervention in such a controversy would risk damaging the public confidence that is vital to the 
functioning of the Judicial Branch . . . by embroiling the federal courts in a power contest nearly at 
the height of its political tension.”) (internal citation omitted).   
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